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The theory of multilevel selection (MLS) is beset with conceptual difficulties.
Although it is widely agreed that covariance between group trait and group
fitness may arise in the natural world and drive a response to ‘group selec-
tion’, ambiguity exists over the precise meaning of group trait and group fit-
ness and as to whether group selection should be defined according to
changes in frequencies of different types of individual or different types of
group. Moreover, the theory of MLS has failed to properly engage with the
problem of class structure, which greatly limits its empirical application to,
for example, social insects whose colonies are structured into separate age,
sex, caste and ploidy classes. Here, I develop a genetical theory of MLS, to
address these problems. I show that taking a genetical approach facilitates a
decomposition of group-level traits – including reproductive success – into
the separate contributions made by each constituent individual, even in the
context of so-called emergence. However, I uncover a novel problem with
the group-oriented approach: in many scenarios, it may not be possible to
express a meaningful covariance between trait and fitness at the level of the
social group, because the group’s constituents belong to separate, irreconcil-
able classes.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the
theory of multilevel selection (MLS: Price, 1972a; Ham-
ilton, 1975; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Keller, 1999; Okasha,
2006; Wilson & Wilson, 2007; West et al., 2008; Gardner
& Grafen, 2009; Leigh, 2010; Nowak et al., 2010; Lion
et al., 2011; Marshall, 2011; Frank, 2012a, 2013).
Having moved on from the controversy as to whether or
not selection can operate at multiple levels – which was,
in part, fuelled by confusing the weak notion of selec-
tion at the group level with the much stronger notion of
adaptation at the group level (reviewed by Gardner &
Grafen, 2009) – social evolution theorists now widely
agree that a covariance between group trait and group
fitness may arise in the natural world, resulting in a
response to group selection.
However, MLS theory continues to be beset by con-
ceptual difficulties (Okasha, 2006 provides an excellent
review). Firstly, ambiguity exists over the precise mean-
ing of group trait. The typical approach taken by MLS
theorists is to treat this as a simple ‘aggregate’ of the
traits of the group’s constituent individuals, but some
researchers have considered that group traits are often
‘emergent’ and may even be undefined at the individ-
ual level (Salt, 1979; Lloyd, 1988; Grantham, 1995;
Okasha, 2006). Secondly, a similar ambiguity arises
over the precise meaning of group fitness. Here, the
typical approach is to define the group’s fitness in terms
of number of daughter individuals, but an alternative
approach instead counts the number of daughter
groups, and these approaches clearly disagree in the
context of variable group size (Arnold & Fristrup, 1982;
Damuth & Heisler, 1988; Sober, 1993; Okasha, 2006;
Rainey & Kerr, 2011). Thirdly, there is ambiguity as to
the focal level in a MLS analysis, with so-called multi-
level selection 1 (MLS-1) describing change in the fre-
quencies of different types of individual and multilevel
selection 2 (MLS-2) describing change in the frequen-
cies of different types of groups (Arnold & Fristrup,
1982; Mayo & Gilinsky, 1987; Damuth & Heisler, 1988;
Okasha, 2001, 2006; Michod, 2011; Rainey & Kerr,
2011).
Moreover, MLS theory has not properly engaged
with the problem of class structure; that is, when
different individuals (or groups) differ in quality for
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nongenetic reasons (West et al., 2008; Gardner & Gra-
fen, 2009; Frank, 2013; West & Gardner, 2013). The
key issues that arise here are the following: first, that
not all offspring are necessarily equal, so a simple count
of offspring number may not adequately capture the
notion of fitness; and, second, that chance associations
between allele and class may drive evolutionary change
that should not be confused with the action of natural
selection and should be carefully separated out of any
theoretical or empirical measure of MLS. All real-world
biological populations exhibit class structure, and
although neglecting such differences in quality may be
reasonable for some taxa (e.g. bacteria; but see Gardner
& K€ummerli, 2008), such complexity is fundamental to
the biology of many organisms of social evolutionary
importance. For example, within colonies of eusocial
insects – the classic ‘superorganisms’ – individuals may
be structured into separate age, sex, caste and ploidy
classes (Gardner & Grafen, 2009). And, indeed, class
structure is central to social evolutionary topics such as
sex allocation (West, 2009), in which parents are
judged according to the sex rather than simply the
number of their offspring. Accordingly, failure to
engage with class structure greatly limits the current
empirical reach of MLS theory.
Here, I develop a genetical theory of MLS to address
these problems. First, I describe the general theory of
selection as it occurs in any medium, captured by Price’s
(1972a) covariance equation, and I discuss the key con-
ceptual elements of the selection covariance. Second, I
provide an overview of Fisher’s (1918, 1930) genetical
theory of natural selection, including the fundamental
theorem of natural selection (Fisher, 1930, 1941), and I
describe the action of natural selection in the context of
class structure. Third, I develop an analogous genetical
theory of MLS, including a fundamental theorem of
MLS and a description of the action of MLS in class-
structured populations. Fourth, I apply the genetical
theory of MLS to resolve the definition of group trait
and group reproductive success, abolish the distinction
between MLS-1 and MLS-2, clarify the relationship
between MLS and ‘Simpson’s paradox’ (Simpson, 1951;
Blyth, 1972), and identify scenarios in which the group
may validly be considered a unit of selection.
A general theory of selection
A general theory of selection is provided by Price’s
(1970, 1972a, 1995) theorem. In general terms, Price’s
theorem describes a difference between two assem-
blages in the average of some numerical quantity of
interest. In evolutionary applications, the two assem-
blages are typically two generations of the same biologi-
cal population and the difference between these two
generations defines an evolutionary change. But Price’s
theorem also has applications beyond evolutionary biol-
ogy (Gardner, 2008).
Price’s theorem emerges from a mapping of ‘parents’
to ‘offspring’ between the two assemblages, and it
decomposes the change in the average of the focal
quantity into two parts: (i) ‘selection’, being the change
that is due to different parents having different num-
bers of offspring; and (ii) ‘transmission’, being the
change that is due to offspring not perfectly resembling
their parents (Frank, 1995, 1998, 2012b; Price, 1995).
In particular, Price’s theorem captures the action of
selection in a covariance form:
DsEi2IðziÞ ¼ covi2Iðvi; ziÞ; (1)
where vi denotes the ith parent’s relative contribution
to the offspring assemblage (i.e. its number of offspring
divided by the average number of offspring per parent)
and zi denotes this parent’s character value (see Appen-
dix 1 for details).
Price’s covariance expression highlights four key con-
ceptual elements of selection. First, the entity upon
which selection acts, identified here as the holder of
the index i, defines the ‘unit of selection’. Second, the
assemblage within which selection acts, identified here
by the index set I, defines the ‘arena of selection’.
Third, the numerical property of the units, identified
here as the variable z, whose aggregate change may be
driven by selection, defines the ‘character under selec-
tion’. Fourth, the numerical property of the units, iden-
tified here as the variable v, which provides the
measure of a unit’s success, defines the ‘target of selec-
tion’. Bringing these elements together, the action of
selection is given by the covariance, taken over all units
within the arena, between the character and the target
of selection (Appendix 1).
The genetical theory of natural selection
Natural selection
Natural selection is a particular kind of selection,
defined by the conjunction of a particular unit, arena,
character and target. Conventionally, the unit of natu-
ral selection is the individual organism, and the arena
of natural selection is a biological population (Darwin,
1859). The character under selection is the heritable
portion of the individual’s phenotypic trait, g; that is, a
weighted sum of the frequencies of the alleles that the
individual carries, the weights being decided by linear
regression analysis (Fisher, 1918; Price, 1970). This
quantity is also known as the individual’s ‘breeding
value’ (Falconer, 1981). And the target of natural selec-
tion is the individual’s ‘fitness’, v; that is an expectation
over future uncertainty of number of offspring
expressed relative to the population average (Grafen,
2000; Appendix 1). Here, I am assuming that there is
no class structure, so that all offspring can be consid-
ered of equal value, but I will relax this assumption in
a later section.
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Making this choice of arena, unit, character and tar-
get of selection explicit in eqn (1) yields a mathematical
statement of natural selection:
DNSEi2IðgiÞ ¼ covi2Iðvi; giÞ: (2)
That is, the action of natural selection is given by the
covariance, taken over all individuals within the popu-
lation, between the individual’s heritable trait and her
fitness. Equation (2) has been termed the ‘secondary
theorem of natural selection’ (Robertson, 1968), and I
will use this term to distinguish the result specific to
the action of natural selection from Price’s (1972a)
more general selection covariance, described in eqn (1),
which has much wider application.
The fundamental theorem of natural selection
The secondary theorem describes the action of natural
selection with respect to any genetical character of
interest. Perhaps the most interesting genetical charac-
ter is the heritable component of fitness itself (Fisher,
1941). Fitness may be decomposed into its genetical
and environmental components, that is vi = gi + ei,
where ei captures nonadditive genotypic effects (such as
dominance, epistasis, synergy and frequency depen-
dence) as well as other more obviously environmental
effects. Making this substitution into eqn (2) yields
DNSEi2IðgiÞ ¼ covi2Iðgi; giÞ þ covi2Iðei; giÞ: And, as
covi2Iðgi; giÞ ¼ vari2IðgiÞ and covi2Iðei; giÞ ¼ 0; this
obtains the ‘fundamental theorem of natural selection’:
DNSEi2IðgiÞ ¼ vari2IðgiÞ: (3)
That is, the change in average fitness ascribed to the
action of natural selection is equal to the (additive)
genetic variance in fitness (Fisher, 1930, 1941). The
importance of this result is that, because variances are
nonnegative, natural selection can only have an
improving effect on fitness. Fisher (1930) used the fun-
damental theorem as justification for the idea that indi-
viduals will appear designed to maximize their fitness
(see Grafen, 2002, 2003 for more on this optimization
view).
Importantly, the fundamental theorem is not con-
cerned with total evolutionary change in fitness, but
only the action of natural selection (Price, 1972b). Non-
selective change in fitness owing to mutation and
changing associations between genes and fitness – col-
lectively termed ‘deterioration of the environment’ by
Fisher (1930) – tends to reduce average fitness (Frank
& Slatkin, 1992). In the past, this subtlety has been lost
on many evolutionary theorists who, considering the
fundamental theorem to be a statement about total
evolutionary change in fitness, asserted that it is incor-
rect or only applies under very special conditions
(reviewed by Edwards, 1994). This conceptual confu-
sion illustrates the importance of being able to mathe-
matically separate the selective versus nonselective
components of evolutionary change (Appendix 1).
Today, disagreement still persists as to the correct
interpretation of the fundamental theorem. For exam-
ple, whereas Okasha (2008) and Ewens (2011) both
regard the theorem as concerning the selection of
genes, I regard it as concerning the selection of individ-
uals. Although the fundamental theorem describes
change in a genetical character, this change is driven
by the differential fitness of individuals. Moreover, the
genetical character represents information – carried by
genes – about the fitness of individuals. That is, the
fundamental theorem emerges from a selection covari-
ance in which the unit of selection is the individual,
the target of selection is the individual’s fitness, and the
character under selection is the heritable portion of the
individual’s fitness. Here, genes merely provide a mate-
rial basis for the inheritance of the individual’s charac-
ter. Indeed, as the above derivation applies equally well
to blending inheritance, genes cannot play a key role in
the theorem’s logic (cf. Gardner, 2011). These points
illustrate the importance of being able to conceptually
separate the unit, arena, character and target of
selection.
Natural selection in class-structured populations
If individuals vary in their propensity to achieve repro-
ductive success, for reasons other than the genes that
they carry (e.g. owing to differences in age, sex, caste
and/or local habitat; Grafen, 2006), then natural selec-
tion cannot be described as a simple covariance of
genetic value with fitness, taken across all individuals
in the population. Firstly, spurious correlations between
heritable traits and nongenetic aspects of individual
quality may drive genetic changes that should not be
conflated with the action of natural selection (Taylor,
1990). Secondly, if offspring vary systematically in their
propensity to achieve reproductive success, then a sim-
ple count of offspring number need not capture an
individual’s genetic legacy across multiple generations
(Price & Smith, 1972). A solution to this problem is to:
(i) separate individuals into classes, such that the only
differences within classes are genetical in nature; (ii)
describe the action of natural selection separately for
each class; and (iii) compute the overall action of natu-
ral selection as a sum across all classes, giving each class
a weight according to the neutral expectation of its
long-term genetic contribution to future generations
(i.e. its ‘reproductive value’; Fisher, 1930; Price, 1970;




ckcovi2Ik ðvi; giÞ; (4)
where Ik denotes the subset of the index set I pertain-
ing to the kth class, ck is the reproductive value of the
kth class, and relative fitness vi is expected offspring
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number divided by the average for all individuals of
that class (see Appendix 2 for details).
The basic idea here is that, in a class-structured popu-
lation, an allele’s frequency may undergo systematic
change even if that allele is entirely neutral. Accord-
ingly, even if natural selection is playing some role in
driving allele frequency change, it may not be responsi-
ble for all of this change. And so, to properly describe
the action of natural selection in terms of genetical
change, it is important to: consider a counterfactual sce-
nario in which alleles are neutral and remain that way
until the end of time; determine the corresponding
change in their frequencies under neutrality; and then
subtract this from the actual allele frequency change
that occurs in the real-world scenario in which natural
selection is operating. The class reproductive values
describe the expected genetic contribution that each
class makes to the distant future in the neutral counter-
factual scenario. Hence, they are calculated under the
assumption of neutrality, even though the wider context
is one in which the action of natural selection is being
described (see the ‘Class effects and Simpson’s paradox’
section, below, for more discussion).
In the context of class structure, natural selection is
given by the class-reproductive-value-weighted sum
(taken over all classes) of the covariance (taken over all
individuals within a class) between the individual’s her-
itable trait and her fitness. Accordingly, the arena of
each selection covariance is the subpopulation of indi-
viduals belonging to a particular class. This is the
approach taken by Price (1970), and my eqn (4) can be
seen as a generalization of his eqn (5), which focused
specifically upon populations structured into female
versus male classes and X-linked genes.
The genetical theory of MLS
Multilevel selection
In the context of social evolution, in which social interac-
tion between individuals mediates the covariance of fit-
ness and genetic values, it is often helpful to decompose
the overall response to natural selection into separate
parts, to aid conceptualization (Gardner et al., 2007). The
MLS approach separates natural selection into its within-
group versus between-group components (Price, 1972a;
Hamilton, 1975; Okasha, 2006). Assuming the absence of
class structure, assigning every group a unique index
j 2 J, assigning each individual to a single group and
denoting the subset of the population that comprises the
jth group by Ij, eqn (2) may be rewritten as follows:
DNSEi2IðgiÞ ¼ covj2J Ei2IjðviÞ;Ei2IjðgiÞ
 
þ Ej2J covi2Ijðvi; giÞ
 
: (5)
The right-hand side of eqn (5) expresses the action of
natural selection as the sum of two terms. The first of
these terms is a selection covariance, in which the unit
of selection is the group (indicated by the index j), the
arena of selection is the population of groups (indicated
by the index set J), the character under selection is the
average genetic value among the individuals in the
group (denoted Ei2IjðgiÞ), and the target of selection is
the average fitness among the individuals in the group
(denoted Ei2IjðviÞ). This selection covariance describes
selection that is operating at the between-group level,
and provides a formal definition of ‘group selection’
(Price, 1972a; Hamilton, 1975). Here, the target of
group selection – that is the average fitness among the
individuals in the group – provides an operational defi-
nition for ‘group fitness’.
The second term is an expectation of selection covari-
ances, in which the unit of selection is the individual
(indicated by the index i), the arena of selection is the set
of individuals within a particular group (indicated by the
index set Ij), the character under selection is the individ-
ual’s genetic value (denoted gi), and the target of selec-
tion is the individual’s relative fitness (denoted vi). This
selection covariance describes selection operating at the
within-group level, and its expectation across all the
groups in the population defines ‘within-group selection’
(Price, 1972a; Hamilton, 1975). Note that, as the unit of
selection here is the individual, within-group selection
has some conceptual claim on the term ‘individual selec-
tion’. However, the same logic would lead to the RHS of
eqn (2) also being termed ‘individual selection’. To avoid
such ambiguous language, I instead use ‘within-group
selection’ to describe the term in eqn (5) and ‘natural
selection’ to describe the term in eqn (2).
The fundamental theorem of MLS
Equation (5) might be termed the ‘secondary theorem
of MLS’, in analogy with eqn (2). This suggests the pos-
sibility for a ‘fundamental theorem of MLS’. Taking
group fitness Vj ¼ Ei2IjðviÞ as the character of interest,
and assigning this a genetic component Gj ¼ Ei2IjðgiÞ
and an environmental component Ej in the usual way,
yields covj2J Ei2IjðviÞ;Ei2IjðgiÞ
  ¼ varj2JðGjÞ: Noting that
DNSEi2I(gj) = DNSEj2J(Gj); then, from eqn (5):
DNSEj2JðGjÞ ¼ varj2JðGjÞ iff Ej2J covi2Ijðvi; giÞ
  ¼ 0:
(6)
That is, the change in average group fitness owing to
the action of natural selection is equal to the genetic
variance in group fitness if and only if there is no selec-
tion within groups. This provides an informal proof of
the idea that groups will only appear designed to maxi-
mize their fitness if there are mechanisms – such as
clonality or repression of competition – that more-or-
less totally abolish selection within groups; otherwise,
natural selection may favour traits that decrease group
fitness and disfavour traits that increase group fitness
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(see Gardner & Grafen, 2009; Gardner, 2013 for more
on this optimization view).
MLS in class-structured populations
Equation (4) provides an expression for the action of
natural selection in a class-structured population.
Assigning individuals to groups j 2 J, and applying the
MLS partition
covi2Ikðvi; giÞ ¼ covj2J Ei2IkjðviÞ;Ei2IkjðgiÞ
 
þ Ej2J covi2Ikjðvi; giÞ
 
;












which separates the action of natural selection into
between-group and within-group components. Note
that the between-group selection covariances have, as
their unit of selection, not a whole social group, but
rather the subgroup of individuals in each social group
that belong to the same class. Correspondingly, the tar-
get of between-group selection is the average fitness of
individuals within the pure-class subgroup, the charac-
ter under between-group selection is the average heri-
table trait of the individuals within the pure-class
subgroup, and the arena of between-group selection is
the population of pure-class subgroups belonging to the
same class. Similarly, the within-group selection covari-
ances have the individual as the unit of within-group
selection, the individual’s heritable trait as the character
under within-group selection, the individual’s fitness as
the target of within-group selection and the pure-class
subgroup as the arena of within-group selection.
Class effects and Simpson’s paradox
In eqn (7), I have described the action of MLS in a class-
structured population, controlling for spurious correla-
tions between heritable traits and fitness that may arise
when individuals vary in quality for other reasons, and
that should not be mistaken for the action of MLS itself.
The idea here is that calculating a covariance is mathe-
matically analogous to performing a least-squares regres-
sion analysis (Gardner et al., 2011) and so, by calculating
selection covariances separately for each class, the effects
of any confounding variables – that collectively define
class membership – are removed. Moreover, weighting
each selection covariance by the reproductive value of
the corresponding class describes its long-term genetic
impact upon the population, and the sum of the weighted
selection covariances describes the overall action of MLS.
For example, consider a neutral or weakly deleterious
allele that is lucky enough to find itself overrepresented
among high-quality individuals. The overall correlation
between gene and fitness may be positive, because car-
riers of the allele tend to be fitter than noncarriers for
reasons that have nothing to do with them carrying the
allele. Accordingly, in the absence of other evolutionary
forces, the allele will increase in frequency, in an
apparent contradiction of Darwin’s (1859) remark: ‘This
preservation of favourable variations and the rejection
of injurious variations, I call Natural Selection. Varia-
tions neither useful nor injurious would not be affected
by natural selection’. The apparent contradiction is
resolved by noting that this change in allele frequency
is not natural selection, but rather a distinct ‘class
effect’. To be clear, the class effect is not particular to
MLS and may also arise in the context of kin selection
analysis: na€ıve application of covariance (or least-
squares regression or differentiation) methodology is
liable to give nonsensical results in the context of class
structure (Allen et al., 2013). Taylor (1990) and Taylor
& Frank (1996) give excellent accounts of kin selection
analysis for class-structured populations.
The class effect relates to a statistical phenomenon
known as ‘Simpson’s paradox’ (Simpson, 1951; Blyth
1972), in which the association between two variables
disappears or even reverses when a third, confounding,
variable is controlled for. The paradox arises when cor-
relation is interpreted as straightforward causation, such
that the same dataset yields two mutually incompatible
causal interpretations (Pearl, 2009, 2014). A classic
example relates to a case of apparent sex discrimination
in the admission of graduate students to the University
of California at Berkeley: female applicants were much
less likely to be admitted than their male counterparts,
suggesting discrimination against women, when all
admissions were considered as a whole; yet, this pattern
vanished when admissions to each department were
considered individually, suggesting no such discrimina-
tion was occurring (Bickel et al., 1975). Further analysis
revealed that female applicants tended to apply to
departments where overall rates of admission were
lower, which explained the apparent sex bias, and the
University was exonerated (Bickel et al., 1975).
Simpson’s paradox has previously been discussed in
the MLS literature, although not in relation to the con-
founding effects of class. In fact, it has been used to
describe the action of MLS itself. Sober & Wilson
(1998) have drawn an analogy between a group-struc-
tured population, in which altruism is associated with
reduced fitness within every group but higher fitness
within the population as a whole, on the one hand,
and the Berkeley sex discrimination case, on the other.
However, I believe that this is a poor analogy. Altruism,
in Sober & Wilson’s (1998) model, is associated with
higher fitness overall, not because of any confounding
variable, but rather because of the causal action of
altruism itself: groups of altruists are fitter because they
are groups of altruists. This is very different from the
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Berkeley case, in which the low rates of admission to
certain departments were – supposedly – not due to
their attracting mainly female applicants. Indeed, if
Berkeley had been deliberately allocating fewer gradu-
ate student positions to these departments because they
were popular with women, then this would clearly
have been sex discrimination.
Collective fitness1 versus collective
fitness2
A much-discussed problem with the theory of MLS is
that it has not been clear whether a group’s reproductive
success should be defined in terms of its number of
daughter individuals or its number of daughter groups
(Arnold & Fristrup, 1982; Damuth & Heisler, 1988;
Sober, 1993; Okasha, 2006; Rainey & Kerr, 2011). This
clearly matters when there is variation in group size.
Okasha (2006) provides an illustrative example, in which
group A produces twelve daughter individuals organized
into four groups of three and group B produces twelve
daughter individuals organized into three groups of four.
By what he terms ‘collective fitness1’, which counts the
number of daughter individuals, groups A and B are
equally successful. But, by what he terms ‘collective fit-
ness2’, which counts the number of daughter groups,
group A is more successful than group B.
The genetical theory of MLS provides a solution to
this problem, by defining the reproductive success of
any unit in terms of its expected long-term genetic con-
tribution to future generations. Because the reproduc-
tive value of any group is a simple sum of the
reproductive values of its constituent individuals, the
reproductive value of the mother group can be calcu-
lated either as the sum of the reproductive values of its
daughter individuals or as the sum of the reproductive
values of its daughter groups, and these two calcula-
tions will always yield the same answer.
In an empirical context, simply counting the number
of daughter individuals – that is the collective fitness1
approach – is appropriate when there is negligible class
structuring of individuals. Such a scenario is unlikely
when groups vary in size and individuals engage in
social interactions within their groups, as individuals in
differently sized groups will experience rather different
social environments, even in a genetically homogenous
population. Conversely, simply counting the number of
daughter groups – that is the collective fitness2
approach – is appropriate when there is negligible class
structuring of groups. Such a scenario is also unlikely
when groups vary in size, unless there is extreme den-
sity regulation such that small groups achieve the same
overall productivity as large groups. More generally,
even though the collective fitness1 and collective
fitness2 approaches will converge upon the same mea-
sure of reproductive success in the absence of variation
in group size, this measure may nevertheless be inade-
quate if individuals and groups are class structured in
other ways. Daughter individuals or groups of low
quality should not be given the same weight as daugh-
ter individuals or groups of high quality in computing
the reproductive success of the parent group but,
instead, each daughter individual or group should be
weighted in proportion to its reproductive value.
Viewing reproductive value as a proper measure of
an entity’s evolutionary success clarifies the relation-
ship between cancer and MLS. Cancer is often concep-
tualized as involving a tension between different levels
of selection, with cancerous tissues achieving higher
reproductive success at a within-organism level and
cancerous individuals suffering lower reproductive suc-
cess at a between-organism level (Okasha, 2006;
Clarke, 2011; Foster, 2011; Goodnight, 2013). However,
somatic tissues – including cancerous ones – do not
generally contribute genes to distant future generations,
on account of the demise of their lineages upon the
death of the organism (Clarke, 2011; Goodnight, 2013).
Consequently, cancerous tissues do not have reproduc-
tive value, and so their proliferation within the organ-
ism cannot correspond to selection in the strict sense of
the genetical theory. The exception is transmissible can-
cer – such as that causing devil facial tumour disease in
Tasmanian devils, and transmitted by biting (Pearse &
Swift, 2006) – which has the potential to survive indef-
initely and hence achieve reproductive value. In such
cases, the cancer represents a separate, parasitic individ-
ual – perhaps even belonging to a distinct species (cf
Vincent, 2010) – rather than a rebellion of the host
individual’s own tissues.
Aggregate characters versus emergent
characters
Analogous to the apparent problems that have been
posed in the literature concerning group fitness, there
has been much discussion of how best to conceptualize
group-level traits (Salt, 1979; Lloyd, 1988; Grantham,
1995; Okasha, 2006). Adopting Okasha’s (2006) termi-
nology: the majority of MLS models have considered
‘aggregate’ traits, where the group trait value is a sim-
ple average of the trait values of its constituent individ-
uals; but this approach has been regarded as incapable
of capturing the action of MLS when group traits are
‘emergent’ and perhaps even undefined at the individ-
ual level. Okasha (2006) discusses the example of the
group’s sex ratio, which is a property of the group
rather than of any of its constituent individuals
(although he notes that each individual in the group
does have the individual-level property of being in a
group with that sex ratio).
The genetical theory of MLS resolves this problem by
considering that natural selection acts only upon the
heritable portion of the phenotype; that is, the charac-
ter under selection is strictly genetical. Importantly, any
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biological entity that contains genes may be ascribed a
trait value that is a simple weighted sum of the
frequencies of the various alleles that it carries, irre-
spective of whether that entity is an individual or a
group. And the genetical character may relate to a phe-
notype that is expressed at any level of biological orga-
nization, not necessarily the one occupied by the focal
entity.
The genetical approach is entirely consistent with the
‘aggregate’ view of group-level traits, in that the
group’s genetical trait value is a simple weighted sum
of the genetical trait values of its constituent individu-
als. But it is also entirely consistent with the ‘emergent’
view of group-level phenotypes, which do not need to
be defined at an individual level in order for individuals
to be assigned genetical scores for them. This is analo-
gous to how a bull may be assigned a breeding value
for milk yield, as a function of his genotype, even
though he does not have udders. Such assignment is
neither arbitrary nor anomalous, but rather plays an
important role in the practice of artificial selection,
because bulls carry genes for milk yield and pass them
on to their daughters, who do express them. Similarly,
in a social evolutionary context, natural selection for
the phenotypes of sterile insect workers is driven by
the differential fitness of reproductive individuals who
have heritable predispositions for, but do not actually
exhibit, those phenotypes (Darwin, 1859).
MLS-1 versus MLS-2
In addition to the difficulties associated with group-
level fitness and group-level traits, the literature on
MLS has been much concerned with the question of
how to describe the evolutionary change associated
with group selection. Building upon the ideas of Da-
muth & Heisler (1988), Okasha (2006) distinguishes
‘MLS-1’, which describes change in the frequencies of
different types of individual (or, more generally, differ-
ent types of ‘particle’), versus ‘MLS-2’, which describes
change in the frequencies of different types of group
(or, more generally, different types of ‘collective’; see
also Arnold & Fristrup, 1982; Mayo & Gilinsky, 1987;
Okasha, 2001). Michod (2011) and Rainey & Kerr
(2011) discuss the MLS-1 versus MLS-2 distinction in
the context of major transitions in evolution (Maynard
Smith & Szathmary, 1995).
The genetical theory of MLS adopts neither of these
two approaches and, instead, describes the action of
group selection in terms of change in a genetical char-
acter. As discussed in the previous section, a genetical
score may be assigned to any biological entity that con-
tains genes – such as an entire population – and change
in this genetical score can be computed, irrespective of
how that population is subdivided into groups and indi-
viduals, or the biological level of organization at which
the corresponding phenotype actually manifests.
One might argue that this genetical approach is merely
an extended MLS view that considers a lower tier of par-
ticles – the genes – and that this is therefore a form of
MLS-1. However, this is incorrect, for two reasons.
Firstly, describing change in the average value of a genet-
ical character is not equivalent to describing change in
the frequencies genetic types. Rather, the genetical char-
acter describes an arbitrarily weighted sum of potentially
multiple allele frequencies, and although these frequen-
cies determine the value of the genetical character, the
reverse need not be true. Secondly, the basic selection
covariance logic can also be applied to heritable charac-
ters that do not have a particulate basis (i.e. blending
inheritance; Gardner, 2011). This clarifies the sense in
which the theory of natural selection is ‘genetical’: this
adjective pertains to the medium by which characters are
inherited, rather than to the unit of selection itself.
Are social groups units of selection?
In eqn (7), I decomposed the action of natural selection
in a class-structured population into separate between-
group and within-group components. Here, the compo-
nent of natural selection that is occurring between







In contrast to the corresponding term appearing in
eqn (5), which described the MLS partition in the
absence of class structure, this quantity is not readily
interpretable as a selection covariance in which the
whole group acts as a unit of selection. Instead, it is a
reproductive-value-weighted sum of selection covari-
ances, each taken over different pure-class subgroups of
individuals rather than over entire social groups.
Accordingly, it is the pure-class subgroup, not the
entire social group, that acts as the unit of selection.
This raises the question of whether and when a
whole social group can be considered a viable unit of
selection, with some measure of group fitness providing
the target of group selection, and some measure of
group genetic value providing the character under
group selection. This can be shown to obtain in some
special scenarios. First, if every social group is homoge-
neous with respect to class, then the pure-class sub-
group is synonymous with the social group itself, and
hence, from eqn (8), the social group is a unit of selec-
tion, its fitness Ei2IkjðviÞ is the target of group selection,
and its genetic value Ei2IkjðgiÞ is the character under
group selection. A trivial example of when this scenario
will apply is when the whole population lacks class
structure, as assumed, for example, by the models of
Gardner & Grafen (2009). However, the scenario will
also apply to class-structured populations so long as all
class differences are between rather than within groups,
as assumed, for example, by the models of Rodrigues &
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Gardner (2012), that consider variation in resource
availability among different groups.
Second, if the pure-class subgroups of a social group
are constrained to have the same average genetic
values (i.e. Ei2IkjðgiÞ ¼ Ei2I:jðgiÞ for all j 2 J and all
k 2 K, where I•j is the set of all individuals within the






recovers the interpretation of the entire social group as
a unit of selection, with a reproductive-value-weighted
average of the fitnesses of its constituent pure-class sub-
groups
P
k2K ckEi2IkjðviÞ providing the target of group
selection and its genetic value Ei2I:jðgiÞ providing the
character under group selection. One example of when
this scenario will apply is when all of a group’s constit-
uent individuals are genetically identical (i.e.
gi ¼ El2I:jðglÞ for all i 2 I.j). Biologically, such group clo-
nality appears to be the most plausible mechanism for
ensuring that the pure-class subgroups have the same
genetic values, but the former is not strictly required
for the latter to obtain.
Third, if the fitnesses of all of a social group’s pure-
class subgroups are equal (i.e. Ei2IkjðviÞ ¼ Ei2I:jðviÞ for all
j 2 J and all k 2 K), then eqn (8) may be re-expressed





recovers the interpretation of the entire social group as
a unit of selection, with the fitness of the social group
Ei2I:jðviÞ providing the target of group selection and a
reproductive-value-weighted average of the genetic
values of its pure-class subgroups
P
k2K ckEi2IkjðgiÞ pro-
viding the character under group selection. Note that
this scenario does not require that all pure-class sub-
groups have equal absolute reproductive success, but
rather that their relative reproductive success (i.e. abso-
lute offspring number divided by the average for their
class) is equal for all subgroups within the social group.
Moreover, it also allows for fitness variation within the
pure-class subgroups.
The issue of whether a group can be considered a
unit of selection is distinct from that of whether a
group can be considered a unit of adaptation, that is
a fitness-maximizing entity. The former requires that a
nonzero portion of natural selection can be expressed
as a selection covariance in which the social group
plays the role of unit of selection and may be assigned
a meaningful measure of fitness. The latter has the
additional requirement that there is also zero selection
within groups – as shown in expression (6) and by
Gardner & Grafen (2009) – such that the necessary and
sufficient criterion for any heritable trait to be favoured
by natural selection is that it improves group fitness.
The importance of being able to describe a selection
covariance that identifies the whole social group – and
not simply the pure-class subgroup – as a unit of selec-
tion is made vivid by considering scenarios in which no
two individuals in the same social group belong to the
same class and in which neither the genetic uniformity
nor the relative fitness uniformity criteria are satisfied.
For example, a parasitoid wasp might oviposit a single
unfertilized (i.e. male) egg and a single fertilized (i.e.
female) egg into a caterpillar, within which these sib-
lings develop and compete for resources, and this yields
both a clearly defined social group of more than one
individual and also ample scope for kin selection. Yet, it
is unclear whether group selection can occur, except in
the trivial sense that a single individual can be consid-
ered a group of size 1, owing to difficulties in bringing
the separate selection covariances for male subgroups
and for female subgroups together into a single selec-
tion covariance.
From a conceptual perspective, this point may help
to illustrate the more general point that, although kin
selection and MLS methodologies are equivalent (they
both describe the action of natural selection, and simply
carve it up in different ways), kin selection is not a spe-
cial kind of group selection that operates between kin
groups (contra Wilson, 1975). Indeed, there can be kin
selection in the absence of group selection, as defined
above, even in populations that are structured into
clearly defined kin groups. From an empirical perspec-
tive, this point highlights that the total reproductive
success of a heterogeneous group may be a meaningless
quantity and that scientific resources might be more
profitably invested into measuring other things.
Conclusion
A genetical approach to MLS addresses several of the dif-
ficulties that have beset this theory of social evolution.
Here, I have resolved the meaning of group trait and
group fitness, highlighted that MLS is defined by change
in a genetical character driven by its covariance with
fitness at individual and group levels and clarified the
connection between MLS and Simpson’s paradox. More-
over, by integrating the theories of class structure and
reproductive value, I have extended the empirical reach
of MLS theory. However, these developments have
shown that it may not always possible to treat whole
social groups as units of selection and that often separate
gene-fitness covariances must be taken over pure-class
subgroups instead. For many empirical scenarios in
which social groups comprise individuals of more than
one class, it may not be possible to bring together the
between-group components of within-class selection
into a single conception of ‘group selection‘, even in the
context of kin selection and social evolution.
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Appendix 1
The Price equation
Price’s (1970, 1972a) theorem emerges from a mapping
between two assemblages of entities – a ‘parent’ assem-
blage and an ‘offspring’ assemblage – which need not
be of a biological nature (Figure A1.1). Each of the
entities in the parent assemblage is assigned a unique
index i 2 I, and its absolute number of descendants in
the offspring assemblage is denoted by wi. The arithme-
tic average of wi among all the entities in the parent
assemblage is Ei2I(wi) = ∑i2Iqiwi, where equal weight-
ing is given to each parent, that is qi = q for all i 2 I
and ∑i2Iqi = 1. Thus, each parent’s success may be
expressed in a relative way, as vi = wi/El2I(wl). The par-
ents may be scored for any property of interest, and
accordingly, each is assigned a numerical trait score zi,
and the average trait value in the parent assemblage is
Ei2I(zi) = ∑i2Iqizi. Finally, a parent’s descendants are col-
lectively assigned an average trait value z0i ¼ zi þ Dzi;
where Dzi captures the difference between parent and
offspring trait values, and the average trait value in the





Hence, the total change in the average trait value
between parent and offspring assemblages is
DEi2IðziÞ ¼ Ei2Iðviz0iÞ  Ei2IðziÞ; or:
DEi2IðziÞ ¼ covi2Iðvi; ziÞ þ Ei2IðviDziÞ (A1.1)
where E denotes an arithmetic average or expectation
and cov denotes a covariance, each taken over the indi-
cated set (Price, 1972a). The left-hand side of
eqn (A1.1) denotes the change in the population aver-
age of the character. The right-hand side of eqn (A1.1)
expresses this change as the sum of two terms. The first
term is the change ascribed to selection and is equal to
the covariance of relative success and character value,
across all entities in the parent population. The second
term is the change ascribed to transmission and is equal
to the average (relative-success-weighted) difference
between the character values of a parent and its off-
spring.
In some applications of Price’s theorem, there is not
one offspring assemblage, but rather a set of possible
offspring assemblages, each having some probability of
realization. Assigning each possible offspring assemblage
a unique index x 2 Ω and denoting parent i’s relative
contribution of offspring under realization x by
vxi ¼ wxi =El2Iðwxl Þ; where wxi is parent i’s absolute con-
tribution of offspring under realization x, eqn (A1.1)
may be rewritten as follows:
DEi2IðziÞx ¼ covi2Iðvxi ; ziÞ þ Ei2Iðvxi Dzxi Þ (A1.2)
which describes the character transformation in the
event of realization of offspring assemblage x. In such
applications of Price’s theorem, it is often appropriate to
Parents Offspring
Figure A1.1 The mapping that forms the basis of Price’s equation.
Differences in shading represent differences in character value, and
the Price equation describes change in the average character value
between parent and offspring populations.
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describe the expected change, averaging over uncer-
tainty as to which of the offspring assemblages will be
realized. This is given by:
DEx2X DEi2IðziÞxð Þ ¼ covi2I Ex2Xðvxi Þ; zi
 
þ Ex2X Ei2Iðvxi Dzxi Þ
 
: (A1.3)
However, this notation is a bit cumbersome, and it is
often more convenient to leave the expectation over
uncertainty implicit. See Grafen (2000) and Gardner &
Grafen (2009) for more on expectations over uncer-
tainty in the context of Price’s theorem.
Price’s theorem is a mathematical tautology, arising
from simple notational definitions rather than from
mechanistic assumptions. Consequently, it is not very
useful for making concrete predictions about evolution-
ary change. Instead, its usefulness lies in how it
provides general definitions for components of evolu-
tionary change. In particular, Price’s theorem provides
a general, formal definition of selection: isolating the
first term from the right-hand side of eqn (A1.1) recov-
ers eqn (1) of the main text.
Moreover, Price’s theorem highlights four key con-
ceptual elements of selection: selection is defined in
terms of change in the expectation of a random vari-
able z, and this variable formally defines the ‘character
under selection’; selective change in the character is
equal to its covariance with a second random variable
v, and this variable formally defines the ‘target of selec-
tion’; these random variables are themselves formally
defined by drawing entities at random from an aggre-
gate and noting their associated character and target
values (Gardner et al., 2011, box 1), the entities being
drawn formally defining the ‘unit of selection’ and the
aggregate from which they are drawn formally defining
the ‘arena of selection’.
Appendix 2
Natural selection in class-structured
populations
The action of natural selection in the absence of class
structure is given by eqn (2) of the main text. Here, I
derive an expression for the action of natural selection
in the presence of class structure, namely eqn (4) of
the main text. Accordingly, I assign individuals to clas-
ses, such that all the individuals in the same class have
the same nongenetic quality. Specifically, in addition to
assigning every individual a unique index i 2 I, I assign
every class a unique index k 2 K. The subset of individ-
uals belonging to class k is denoted Ik (Figure A2.1).
Equation (2) of the main text was derived from a
mapping between consecutive parent and offspring
generations, and this is appropriate in the absence of
class structure because all offspring have equal value,
and hence, expected relative contribution of offspring
to the next generation provides a proper measure of
each parent’s evolutionary success. However, in the
context of class structure, offspring may vary in their
value, and it is necessary to instead consider each indi-
vidual’s expected long-term genetic contribution to
future generations; that is, her ‘reproductive value’
(Figure A2.1). I denote individual i’s reproductive value
as fi and, following Taylor (1990), I scale this such that
the average reproductive value among all the parent
individuals is Ei2I(fi) = 1. Note that other scalings are
equally valid: for example, figure 2 of Fisher (1930)
employed a scaling such that a female’s reproductive
value at birth is 2.
The selection covariance emerging from this mapping
between the parent generation and a distant future
generation is covi2Iðfi; giÞ: Note that this is analogous to
the selection covariance on the RHS of eqn (2) of the
main text, except that the target of selection is the indi-
vidual’s expected long-term genetic contribution to the
future (reproductive value, fi) rather than the individ-
ual’s expected relative offspring number (fitness, vi).
However, covi2Iðfi; giÞ does not provide a proper
account of the action of natural selection acting in the
parental generation, because it includes effects of class
membership (i.e. because individuals vary in quality for
nongenetic reasons, covi2Iðfi; giÞ may be nonzero even
in a neutral population in which natural selection can-
not be acting), and because it includes the effects of
natural selection in all generations from the present
into the distant future. These separate effects may be
isolated by writing fi ¼ ~fi þ
P1
t¼1 Dt fi; where ~fi is the
reproductive value that the ith individual would enjoy
under neutrality and Dtfi is the deviation from this neu-
tral expectation owing to gene effects in the tth genera-
tion, starting with her own generation at t = 1.
Parents Offspring
Figure A2.1 The Price equation mapping for a class-structured population. When individuals differ both in their genetical characters
(shading) and in their class (hats), number of offspring does not provide an adequate measure of evolutionary success, i.e. long-term
contribution of genes to future generations.
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That is, if, in addition to considering the real-world
scenario in which selection is operating, one considers
a counterfactual scenario in which all genes are neutral,
fi describes the individual’s expected long-term genetic
contribution in the selection scenario, ~fi describes her
expected long-term genetic contribution in the neutral
counterfactual scenario, and the difference between
these two quantities
P1
t¼1 Dt fi describes the cumulative
action of natural selection acting in every generation
from the present to the distant future. Thus, there are
three ways for individuals to achieve high reproductive
value: they may be born with high reproductive value,
on account of their class (high ~f ); they may achieve high
reproductive value, on account of the action of their
superior genes (high D1f); and they may have high repro-
ductive value thrust upon them on account of the
genetic superiority of their descendants (high
P1
t¼2 Dt f ).
To make this decomposition of reproductive value
more concrete, I write fi ¼ vif 0i , where vi is the individ-
ual’s expected number of offspring relative to the aver-
age for her class and f 0i ¼ fi=vi is the average
reproductive value she gains for each of these standar-
dized offspring units, in the selection scenario. Expected
relative number of offspring may be written as
vi ¼ evi þ Dvi; where evi ¼ 1 is the expectation under the
neutral counterfactual scenario and Dvi is the deviation
in expected relative number of offspring owing to natu-
ral selection. Likewise, average reproductive value per
standardized offspring unit may be written as
f 0i ¼ ~f 0i þ Df 0i ; where ~f 0i is the expectation under the neu-
tral counterfactual scenario and Df 0i is the deviation due
to natural selection. It follows that ~fi ¼ ~f 0i ;D1fi ¼ Dvi~f 0i
and
P1
t¼2 Dt fi ¼ viDf 0i :
Substituting the components of reproductive value
into the selection covariance covi2Iðfi; giÞ yields:







The first term on the RHS of eqn (A2.1) describes the
portion of the expected long-term genetic change that
would occur even if the genes were entirely neutral in
their effects, which I term the class effect. The second
term describes the portion of the expected long-term
change that occurs because of the impact of genes on
fitness in the focal generation, which defines the imme-
diate action of natural selection. And the third compo-
nent describes the portion of the expected long-term
change that occurs because of the impact of genes on
fitness in future generations. An illustrative example of
this partition of class and selective effects is given in
Appendix 3.
Hence, a proper statement of the immediate action of
natural selection, acting in the present generation, but
having a long-term impact upon the genetic composi-
tion of the population, is given by the second term on
the RHS of eqn (A2.1):
DNSEi2IðgiÞ ¼ covi2IðD1fi; giÞ: (A2.2)
Here, the target of natural selection is not the entirety
of the individual’s reproductive value, but rather the
portion that owes to the impact of genes on fitness. It is
defined for any strength of selection, but its conceptual-
ization has involved making a comparison with a neu-
trality counterfactual scenario in which selection is
absent. Note, the LHS of eqn (A2.2) describes a portion
of the actual expected long-term genetic change, and
not a reproductive-value-weighted expected short-term
genetic change (see below for more discussion).
Typically, the action of natural selection in the con-
text of class structure is written as a weighted sum of
covariances that are taken separately over individuals
of each class: for example, eqn (5) of Price (1970). To
express eqn (A2.2) in this form, I first separate its RHS
into its within-class versus between-class effects:
DNSEi2IðgiÞ ¼ covk2K Ei2IkðD1fiÞ;Ei2IkðgiÞð Þ
þ Ek2K covi2IkðD1fi; giÞð Þ: (A2.3)
Note that, by virtue of the definition of class, all indi-
viduals belonging to the same class have offspring with
the same neutral reproductive value (which entails
~f 0i ¼ eF 0k for all i 2 Ik and all k 2 K). Accordingly,





QkeF 0kcovi2Ik vi; gið Þ; (A2.4)
where Qk ¼
P
i2Ik qi is the proportion of parental individ-
uals that belong to the kth class. Finally, making the
substitution ck ¼ QkeF 0k recovers eqn (4) of the main text.
Here, ck is the reproductive value of class k, being the
probability that a gene drawn at random from the dis-
tant future would originate from class k in the present
generation, were there to be no natural selection operat-
ing in the present – or any future – generation. For the
special case in which all individuals belong to the same
class – that is there is only one element k 2 K, such that
Ik = I and ck = 1 – eqn (4) reduces to eqn (2).
Note that the above treatment of natural selection in
class-structured populations makes no assumption of
weak selection or vanishingly rare mutant alleles and,
accordingly, it differs in various details from some pre-
vious treatments (Taylor, 1990, 1996). Indeed, whereas
the apparent contradiction of defining the action of nat-
ural selection in terms of class reproductive values that
are calculated under neutrality has typically been
resolved by assuming vanishingly weak selection, my
resolution instead involves a contrast between a natural
selection scenario and a neutral counterfactual scenario,
whereby the class reproductive values emerge from
consideration of the latter and are used to ascertain
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how much of the expected genetic change occurring in
the former would have occurred even in the absence of
natural selection.
Also, I have described the individual’s reproductive
value as the expectation over uncertainty of her genetic
contribution to the distant future, and this differs from
some previous uses of the term, to describe either her
realized long-term contribution or her expected contri-
bution conditional upon a given pedigree (i.e. her
descendants are specified but uncertainty remains as to
the genes that they carry; Barton & Etheridge, 2011).
In addition, I have conceptualized natural selection as
being driven by fitness differences – that is differences
in expected relative offspring number – within classes.
Selection for traits that alter offspring class rather than
offspring number, such as sex allocation, may be con-
ceptualized as acting upon the offspring themselves and
driven by differences in their fitness, as was done by
Taylor & Frank (1996). That is, such effects contribute
to the action of natural selection in the subsequent,
rather than the present, generation.
Finally, I have conceptualized the action of natural
selection in the context of class structure as a portion of
the expected long-term genetic change of the popula-
tion, as opposed to the immediate genetical change
occurring from one generation to the next (or a portion
thereof). This differs from previous treatments, begin-
ning with Fisher (1930), that have conceptualized the
action of natural selection in terms of the immediate
change in the class-reproductive-value-weighted aver-
age of the frequencies of alleles across the different clas-
ses in the population. My approach directly relates to
the idea that natural selection has long-term conse-
quences for biological populations that may not be fully
captured by considering only a single generation of
actual genetic change. Fisher’s (1930) approach provides
a convenient means of bringing those long-term effects
into the focal generation, by incorporating information
about the future prospects of alleles into their present
population frequencies. Although conceptually distinct,
these two approaches yield exactly the same mathemat-
ical result, and their numerical equivalence is illustrated
in Appendix 3. A mathematical and historical overview
of the theory of reproductive value, generalizing beyond
discrete classes, is provided by Grafen (2006).
Appendix 3
Allele frequency change in a haplodiploid
population
Many animal species exhibit haplodiploid inheritance,
whereby daughters are produced in the usual way, by
fusion of a female’s egg with a male’s sperm, but males
develop from unfertilized eggs. Consequently, males are
haploid and females are diploid. Males draw all their
genes from their mother, whereas females draw half of
their genes from each parent.
This bizarre form of inheritance may lead to compli-
cated gene frequency dynamics, comprising both class
effects and truly naturally selective effects. For exam-
ple, consider a haplodiploid population in which there
is a strongly female biased sex ratio that remains con-
stant over generations, so that the ‘per capita’ frequency
of any gene at any time is approximately equal to its
frequency in females (this may be unrealistic if male
fecundity is limiting; Gardner, 2014). If all of the males
are initially hemizygous for a neutral allele A and all of
the females are initially homozygous for a neutral allele
a at the same locus then, initially, the frequency of the
A allele will be approximately zero (because males are
rare). However, in the next generation the frequency
of this allele will leap to approximately 0.5, because
every female will inherit this allele from her father and
will inherit the other allele from her mother. Moreover,
none of the males in this generation will carry the A
allele. Consequently, in the second generation, the fre-
quency of the A allele will be approximately 0.25,
because only half of the females will inherit it from
their mother and none of them will inherit it from their
father. Table A3.1 records the allele frequencies over
multiple generations.
The per capita frequencies are plotted in Figure A3.1
panel (a). Note that the frequency of the A allele in
females asymptotes to p = 1/3 (the same is true of its
frequency in males). Thus, there is an apparent long-
term increase in allele A’s frequency of (1/3) – 0 = 1/3.
Both alleles are neutral, so this is not the work of natu-
ral selection. Rather, it is a class effect. The class repro-
ductive value of males is cm = 1/3 under haplodiploidy,
which means that 1/3 of genes in the distant future
trace back to males and cf = 2/3 trace back to females,
under neutrality. Awarding each of the nm males in the
population, an equal share of their class’s reproductive
value yields a male’s reproductive value of fm = 1/
(3nm). Similarly, the reproductive value of each female
is ff = 2/(3nf), where nf is the number of females in the














(p* = cfpf + cmpm)
1 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3333
2 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 0.3333
3 0.2500 0.5000 0.2500 0.3333
4 0.3750 0.2500 0.3750 0.3333
5 0.3125 0.3750 0.3125 0.3333
6 0.3438 0.3125 0.3438 0.3333
7 0.3281 0.3438 0.3281 0.3333
8 0.3359 0.3281 0.3359 0.3333
9 0.3320 0.3359 0.3320 0.3333
10 0.3340 0.3320 0.3340 0.3333
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population. Because nf ≫ nm, then fm ≫ ff; that is, an
individual male has higher reproductive value than an
individual female, and so the A allele – which is over-
represented in males – enjoys an increase in frequency
owing to the class effect.
Panel (b) reveals the fate of the A allele if it enjoys a
selective advantage of 100% in generation 1 (solid line)
and thereafter behaves neutrally (broken line). This
makes no difference to its course over the generations.
This is because there is no genetic variance within
either class in generation 1 and, hence, there is no
selection operating within either class in this genera-
tion. Panel (c) reveals the fate of the allele if it enjoys
its selective advantage in generations 1 and 2 (solid
line) and thereafter behaves neutrally (broken line). In
generation 2, there is genetic variation among females,
and consequently, the A allele is favoured by natural
selection in this generation. Note that its actual fre-
quency decreases from generation 2 to generation 3,
but less sharply than it would have done under neu-
trality (grey broken line). This is reflected in its asymp-
totic frequency being > 1/3, and this disparity D2 in its
asymptotic frequency defines the selective progress it
made on the account of the fitness superiority of its
bearers in generation 2. Panel (d) reveals the fate of
the A allele if it enjoys a selective advantage over 10
generations: it rises towards fixation. Its selective pro-
gress in each generation can be measured by contrast-
ing with counterfactuals in which it was neutral in this
and every subsequent generation (grey broken lines).
The selective progress attained in generations 2, 3, 4





Figure A3.1 Dynamics of allele
frequency change under haplodiploidy.
Here, Δt describes the portion of the
expected long-term genetic change that
owes to the action of natural selection
in generation t.
(a) (b)
(c) (d) Figure A3.2 Dynamics of class-
reproductive-value-weighted allele
frequency change under haplodiploidy.
Here, Δt describes the reproductive-
value-weighted expected short-term
genetic change that owes to the action
of natural selection in generation t, and
which is conceptually different – but
numerically equivalent – to how
natural selection is captured in
Figure A3.1.
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Also included in Table A3.1 are reproductive-value-
weighted allele frequencies, p* = cfpf + cmpm. These
describe the average frequency in males and females,
weighting each sex’s allele frequency by its reproduc-
tive value. The calculation for generation 1 is (2/
3) 9 0 + (1/3) 9 1 = 1/3; in generation 2, the calcula-
tion is (2/3) 9 (1/2) + (1/3) 9 0 = 1/3; and the fre-
quency remains at p* = 1/3 for every subsequent
generation. Thus, weighting each class’s allele fre-
quency by its reproductive value when calculating the
population frequency of the allele provides an alterna-
tive – but equivalent – means for removing the class
effect from allele frequency change (Fisher, 1930; Leh-
mann & Rousset, 2014), as discussed in Appendix 2.
This neutrality scenario is plotted in Figure A3.2 panel
(a). And panel (b) again reveals the fate of the A allele if
it enjoys a selective advantage of 100% in generation 1
(solid line) and thereafter behaves neutrally (broken
line): there is no change in the allele’s frequency,
because there is no response to natural selection (as
there is no genetic variation within either class) in gener-
ation 1. Panel (c) again reveals the fate of the allele if it
enjoys its selective advantage in generations 1 and 2
(solid line) and thereafter behaves neutrally (broken
line). In generation 2, there is genetic variation among
females, and consequently, the A allele is favoured by
selection. It increases in frequency in this generation
only and thereafter remains at its new frequency. Note
that this increase in frequency D2 is exactly equal to the
asymptotic progress made by the allele in Figure A3.1
panel (c). Thus, the reproductive value weighting recov-
ers the asymptotic fate of the allele, but describes this
effect immediately in the generation in which selection
has operated. That is, natural selection acting in the pres-
ent generation has gene frequency consequences for the
long-term future, and reproductive value weightings
provide a means for describing these future conse-
quences immediately in the present. Panel (d) illustrates
this principle for multiple generations of selection.
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